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Introduction:  The Automobile and the Sociotechnical Order 
 
Political theorist Langdon Winner rejects the conventional belief that modern technologies are 
neutral and apolitical.  In defending the claim that "artifacts have politics,"2 he argues that "the 
interconnected systems of manufacturing, communications, transportation and the like that have 
arisen during the past two centuries ... form de facto a constitution of sorts, the constitution of a 
sociotechnical order."3   There is no clearer illustration of this point than the automobile.  
Perhaps the most conspicuous and distinctive feature of contemporary industrial society, it is both 
an immensely useful appliance and a cultural icon.  Its associated infrastructure of roads, bridges, 
                                                 
1.     This article is accurate to late fall 1996, when the manuscript was submitted with revisions 
in response to the comments of reviewers.  
2.     Langdon Winner, The Whale and the Reactor: A Search for Limits in an Age of High 
Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 3-58. 
3.     Ibid., p. 47. 
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service stations, shopping malls and parking lots is the dominant influence on the urban and 
suburban landscapes.  Automobiles also dominate our lives in more subtle ways, reflected in 
Eduardo Galeano's observation a quarter-century ago that in the streets of Caracas, "enormous and 
expensive machines abound for producing pleasure or speed or sound or light.  Like poor 
frightened ants we face these machines and wonder: ` Jesus, is each of these really worth more than 
me?'."4 
 It is possible to conceive of a future in which automobiles would play a far more modest 
part in our lives and our cityscapes.  Academic planners and activists alike have put forward a 
vision of cities in which high residential densities and mixed uses make automobile travel less 
necessary and in which various "traffic calming" measures, such as residential streets designed to 
limit traffic speeds and volumes, are used to reduce the impact of traffic flows on safety and the 
quality of city life.5  With reference to a planning exercise recently completed in the city of 
London (Ontario), Canada, the present article shows how superficially neutral planning 
methodologies can embody a strong bias against such a future, and situates the issue of 
auto-centred land use planning within the broader context of urban ecology and political economy. 
 There are important reasons to reduce the importance of automobiles in urban land use 
planning, quite apart from the aesthetic and quality-of-life concerns associated with the creation of 
a landscape of strip malls and parking lots.  (Such concerns are admittedly intractable for 
purposes of policy; some people may actually like such a landscape, and many others may simply 
                                                 
4.     Eduardo Galeano, "The Civilization of Black Gold," in We Say No, trans. Mark Fried and 
others (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992), p. 112. 
5.     Peter Calthorpe, The Next American Metropolis: Ecology, Community, and the American 
Dream (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 1993); Citizens Advocating Responsible 
Transportation (CART), Traffic Calming: The Solution to Urban Traffic and a New Vision for 
Neighbourhood Livability (available from Sensible Transportation Options for People, 15405 SW 
116th Avenue, #202B, Tigard, OR 97224-2600, U.S.A.); Peter Newman, Jeffrey Kenworthy and 
Peter Vintila, "Can we overcome automobile dependence?  Physical planning in an age of urban 
cynicism," Cities 12 (1995), pp. 53-65.   
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tune it out or regard it as entirely outside their control.)   Reliance on the automobile is one of the 
most conspicuously unsustainable aspects of human activity in North America almost regardless 
of how sustainability is defined.  In addition to being a significant source of localized air 
pollution, automobiles contribute heavily to the industrialized countries' disproportionate share of 
global fossil fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions.  Auto-related land uses such as 
roads, parking lots and car dealerships account for a remarkably high proportion of all land uses in 
urban areas, especially where urban population densities are low.  There is a connection between 
land use and other environmental impacts, as well.  Peter Newman and Jeffrey Kenworthy have 
demonstrated a striking inverse correlation between urban population density and gasoline 
consumption in 32 of the world's cities:  the lower the density, the higher the fuel consumption.6  
Such relationships are important because of their long-term nature.  Road construction and 
upgrading have a strong effect on the feasible and economically attractive range of subsequent 
land use choices and patterns.  Once established, those patterns leave cities and suburbs alike with 
only limited flexibility to respond to changed circumstances or citizen preferences; the 
constitution of the sociotechnical order is, quite literally, cast in concrete.  
 For this reason, the fact that auto-oriented settlement patterns create substantial 
differentials in access to mobility that are related to class, race, gender, age and (dis)ability should 
carry considerable ethical weight.   Access to automobiles is not evenly distributed throughout 
the population.   When distances or safety considerations preclude walking and when public 
transportation is inadequate, people under the legal driving age are dependent on others for 
transportation, as many a suburban parent will attest.  So are many people of advanced years, or 
with a variety of medical conditions that preclude safe driving.   Economic factors must also be 
considered.  In 1993, at least 35 percent of households in the bottom one-fifth (quintile) of 
                                                 
6.     Peter Newman and Jeffrey Kenworthy, "Transport and urban form in thirty-two of the 
world’s principal cities," Transport Reviews 11 (1991), pp. 249-272. 
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Canada's income distribution, and at least 22 percent of those in the second quintile, did not own a 
vehicle.  Among single-parent households with children under the age of 18, 34 percent did not 
own a vehicle; given the much more precarious economic status of households headed by a single 
female parent, it is reasonable to suppose that single mothers and their children are especially 
disadvantaged in this respect.7 
 The interactions of gender and economics are striking.   Ann Markusen has pointed out 
"the lonely squandering of urban time" associated with a cityscape in which a woman working 
outside the home, yet with typical child-care responsibilities, might have to spend one hour and 55 
minutes a day driving around.8   Not all women have access to a car; a study of commuting 
patterns in the Toronto suburb of Scarborough found that single mothers who worked full time 
outside the home, as a majority of them did, were especially likely to be "transit captives."  This is 
hardly surprising given the high percentage of single mothers whose families live on incomes 
below official low-income cutoffs.  Such women confront both special demands on their time 
(because transit routes tend not to be planned around the distinctive pattern of women's days) and 
serious restrictions on their employment options.9  The result amounts to a captive female labour 
force in certain parts of the suburbs.10   
                                                 
7.     Figures are from Statistics Canada 13-218, Household Facilities by Income and Other 
Characteristics, 1993 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994), tables 9 and 4.9, respectively. 
The need for approximation arises because precise figures on the connections among low income, 
gender and lack of access to a vehicle are available only through custom calculations whose cost is 
estimated at $400 by Statistics Canada. 
8.     Ann Markusen, "The Lonely Squandering of Urban Time," in J. Zimmerman (ed.), The 
Technological Woman: Interfacing with Tomorrow (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 94-101. 
9.     Gerda Wekerle and Brent Rutherford, "Employed Women in the Suburbs: Transportation 
Disadvantage in a Car-Centred Environment," Alternatives: Perspectives on Society, Technology 
and Environment 14 (no. 3, 1987), pp. 49-54. 
10.     Ibid., see also Brent Rutherford and Gerda Wekerle, "Captive Rider, Captive Labor: 
Spatial Constraints and Women’s Employment," Urban Geography 9 (1988), pp. 116-137. 
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 The local environmental impacts of automobile use are disproportionately borne by those 
with modest incomes and assets.  Urban property values tend to be inversely correlated with air 
quality, which is a function of industrial emissions but also, in most urban areas, of proximity to 
high volumes of vehicle traffic.  Although more detailed research would serve to refine the 
observation, we can reliably infer that the least desirable (and perhaps least healthy) residential 
locations tend to be occupied by people who cannot go elsewhere, and that the air pollution, noise 
and safety hazards (at least for pets, small children and the elderly) associated with automobile 
traffic are all important contributors to the low perceived quality of residential life in those 
locations.  
   None of these situations just happened.  Each is, at one level, the result of an accumulation 
of consumer decisions to buy cars and use them in preference to other modes of transportation, but 
the process of making such decisions disenfranchises a substantial proportion of the population: if 
you cannot afford or operate a car, you are without a vote in the transportation marketplace.  More 
fundamental transportation choices are made at the level of public policy.  In the United States, 
suburbanization was actively encouraged by federal subsidies for freeway construction; by the 
mortgage lending policies of federal agencies; and by the tax deductibility of mortgage interest.11 
In Canada, the province of Ontario alone provided grants totalling C$ 3.3 billion between 1988 and 
1992 to municipalities to cover part of the cost (usually 50 percent, but sometimes more) of road 
upgrading.12  Ontario cities have therefore built roads with 50-cent dollars, effectively isolating 
                                                 
11.     Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Surburbanization of the United States (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 190-218, 293; James A. Kushner, Apartheid in America 
(Frederick, MD: Associated Faculty Press, Inc.), pp. 20-30; Michael G.H. McGeary, "Ghetto 
Poverty and Federal Policies and Programs," in L. Lynn and M. McGeary (eds.), Inner-City 
Poverty in the United States (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1990), pp. 224-227, 
231. 
12.     Ontario Ministry of Treasury and Economics, Estimates (Toronto, Government of 
Ontario, 1988-1992; Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Provincial Financial Assistance to 
Municipalities, Boards and Commissions (Toronto, Government of Ontario, 1988-92). 
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local taxpayers from direct financial feedback about the cost of cutting a few minutes from 
automotive travel time.  Income and property tax systems designed without any reference to 
effects on the urban fabric have made parking lots a highly lucrative land use in many Canadian 
cities.13    
 Public policy choices about urban transportation are crucial in terms of making a transition 
to a future that is both more sustainable and more equitable.  As suggested by Winner's concept of 
the constitution of a sociotechnical order, such decisions are laced with political meaning.  Quite 
apart from environmental considerations, were a statute or constitutional amendment proposed 
whose effect was to entrench inequalities of the kind just outlined, it would probably be rejected 
out of hand as impermissibly discriminatory with reference to a number of categories  (e.g. age, 
gender and disability) defined under both Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
national and various provincial human rights codes.14  Because of a variety of assumptions about 
the implausibility of more than incremental changes in the present role of technology in society,15 
political choices about transportation planning have allowed these discriminatory effects as well as 
the more familiar environmental destruction associated with auto-related infrastructure to continue 
unchallenged, and even unexamined.  The case study that follows helps us to understand how this 
process works. 
 
                                                 
13.     Leonard Zehr, "Parking lots a paved paradise for investors," The Globe and Mail, August 
22, 1995, pp. B1, B2. 
14.     Class is the exception: in a market based social and economic system organized around 
allocating resources (including access to the courts) based on ability to pay, and around the 
implicit correlation of moral worth with that ability, it would be extraordinary were courts to 
regard class as an invalid basis for discrimination.  Indeed, the vocabulary of "discrimination" 
would probably be considered irrelevant.  
15.     See Kristin Shrader-Frechette, "Environmental Impact Assessment and the Fallacy of 
Unfinished Business," Environmental Ethics 4 (Spring 1982), esp. pp. 40-43. 
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Transportation Planning in London, Ontario: The Local Dimension  
 
London, Ontario is a southwestern Ontario city of approximately 300,000 people located midway 
between Toronto and Windsor.  Like most of its Ontario counterparts, its development has been 
shaped by the automobile for well over half a century.16  In 1992, overriding vehement objections 
from many surrounding townships, the provincial government (then controlled by the mildly 
social democratic New Democratic Party) allowed the City of London to annex some 26,000 
hectares of land contiguous with its borders, making London's land area four-fifths as large as 
Metropolitan Toronto's.  In July 1992 the London Free Press revealed that at least 65 substantial 
parcels of land in the areas to be annexed, ranging in size from 37 acres to 744 acres, were already 
in the hands of absentee owners.  These speculators included many firms active in the London 
home building and commercial real estate market, at least one with strong provincial and national 
partisan connections.  Such speculative land holdings amounted to more than 10 percent of the 
total area to be annexed and to more than 25 percent of the area to be annexed in London 
Township, on the city's northern edge, whose desirability as a residential and commercial location 
is enhanced by proximity to the city's largest hospital and to the University of Western Ontario.  
 In the aftermath of annexation the city's planning department began drafting a revised 
Official Plan, as required by the terms under which the Ontario government approved annexation, 
and contracted with IMC Consulting Group Inc. to conduct a Transportation Plan Review (TPR) as 
a key element of the exercise.  The final report of the review is the focus of this section of the 
article; it consisted primarily of a list of road widening and upgrading projects costing an estimated 
C$ 223 million by the year 2011,17 not including the costs of a high-speed ring road that would 
                                                 
16.     Gerald T. Bloomfield, "No Parking Here to Corner: London Reshaped by the Automobile, 
1911-61," Urban History Review 18 (no. 2, October 1989), pp. 139-158. 
17.     IMC Consulting Group, London Transportation Plan Review: Executive Summary (March 
1994), p. 3.7 (Table 3.5).  In this article I have cited both the Executive Summary of this study and 
the full report, because the Executive Summary provides both a more succinct summary of 
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eventually incorporate a number of existing multi-lane roads on the city’s perimeter.  The TPR 
recommended "corridor protection" for the route of the ring road, but made no attempt to estimate 
its cost.  
 Several criticisms can be made of the TPR.  First, its time frame was inappropriately short, 
extending only to the year 2011, although both the roads proposed and the associated land use 
patterns will be around long after that.18  This makes potentially more serious its neglect of such 
possibilities as substantial increases in oil prices driven by international markets, or the long-term 
effects of continued increases in the cost of owning and operating a car combined with stagnation 
or decline in the real incomes of a substantial part of the population. 
 Second, it excluded a priori any consideration of arguments that a fundamental change in 
transportation planning priorities might be necessary.  The study's authors stated flatly that 
"[t]ransportation planning is based largely on existing travel patterns, especially between home 
and work."19  The consultants selected a transportation strategy they labelled as Increased 
Transportation Management in preference to two alternative strategies, which they called 
Continuing Trends and Major Lifestyle Changes.20  However, Increased Transportation 
Management actually represented at best a modest departure from the status quo.  From today's 
share of 8.6 percent of total passenger trips, transit usage was projected to rise to just 10 percent in 
                                                                                                                                                             
conclusions and in some instances, especially on the topic of public participation, a more explicit 
statement of the authors' predispositions.  All quotations from the Executive Summary have been 
checked for consistency with the findings of the full report. 
18.     This important point was reflected in the choice of a much more distant year (2040) as the 
endpoint for a regional planning exercise begun in 1992 by the Metropolitan Portland, Oregon 
planning department.  See Metro Region 2040 Update, Fall 1994 (Portland: Metro Planning 
Department, 600 NE Grand Ave., Portland, OR 97232-2736). 
19.     IMC, Executive Summary, p. 1.1; see also IMC Consulting Group, London Transportation 
Plan Review: Final Report (March 1994), Part II, pp. 2.4, 2.7, 2.10. 
20.     IMC, Final Report, Part I, pp. 3.15-3.19. 
 
 
9
2001 and 12 percent by 2011.21  Targets for transportation demand management were also 
modest,22 and only a limited number of measures to achieve them were proposed.  Meanwhile, 
the TPR warned ominously that "if the auto trip reduction targets are not achieved, additional road 
improvements will be required" and strongly recommended protecting rights of way for future 
road widenings, just in case.  To their credit, the consultants flagged the possibility of municipal 
acquisition for light rail transit purposes of rail corridors that might be abandoned in the future, 
while expressing caution about the "financial viability" of such a system.23  However, that 
viability would in turn depend on how cheap and convenient other municipal policies had made 
automobile travel.  
 The alternative of Major Lifestyle Changes, according to the consultants, might involve 
not only using such corridors for crosstown transit and bicycle routes but also such measures as 
bans on private automobiles in the downtown core; construction of an extensive bicycle network; 
strict limits on the supply of parking in the city; and no further roadway construction.24   
However, it was dismissed on the basis that: "The `existing' general public does not appear to be 
ready to accept the significant lifestyle changes" that would be involved.25  This is one instance 
among many in which the consultants invoked the constraint of public opinion, thereby precluding 
any thought of basic changes to the urban fabric or to a settlement pattern in which suburbanites 
commute to and from downtown jobs.  Predictably, the study assumed that "the vast majority" of 
the city of London's projected population growth of 80,000 during the study period "will be 
                                                 
21.     IMC, Executive Summary, p. 3.5 
22.     They consist of "a 15% reduction in use of low occupancy private autos during peak hours 
in the City."  Ibid., p. 4.1. 
23.     IMC, Final Report, Part II, p. 2.16. 
24.     Ibid., Part I, p. 3.18. 
25.     Ibid., Part I, p. 3.19. 
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accommodated through contiguous suburban expansion of existing neighbourhoods around the 
edge of the City," whereas most employment growth will occur downtown. 
 The option of promoting increased residential densities "through infill and redevelopment 
of older neighbourhoods" was dismissed as "costly and ... expected to face major opposition from 
existing residents who wish to retain the existing character of these older neighbourhoods."26  The 
fact that many such neighbourhoods may destroyed by the proximity of planned six-lane arterial 
roads, and that considerations of property acquisition cost would actually favour such destruction 
in preference to the acquisition of commercial property,27 was not mentioned.  Neither was the 
fact that drivers' ability to take short-cuts through residential neighbourhoods, behaviour which 
was cited as a justification for arterial road widenings,28 can be effectively reduced by use of 
various traffic calming measures.29       Third, given their frequent invocation of 
considerations of public opinion and public acceptability, the consultants' approach to public 
participation was disturbing.  No public meetings were held, with the exception of a single two 
and a half hour introductory information meeting.  The consultants claimed that public meetings 
only "bring out the same participatory individuals with self-selective [sic] biases."30  Instead 
consumer surveys, focus groups, and a variety of briefing meetings with interest groups were used 
to solicit opinion on London's transportation future.  Harking back to Winner's idea of the 
constitution of a sociotechnical order, even after the debasement of Canadian constitutional 
discourse by the federal Conservative government between 1984 and 1993, it is hard to imagine 
making constitutional decisions on the basis of polls and focus groups.   
                                                 
26.     IMC, Executive Summary, p. 3.2 
27.     IMC, Final Report, Part II, pp. 3.6-3.7. 
28.     IMC, Executive Summary, p. 2.2. 
29.     CART, Traffic Calming, pp. 17-20; Calthorpe, Next American Metropolis, pp. 44-46, 
95-101. 
30.     IMC, Executive Summary, p. 1.2. 
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 The theoretical rationale for criticizing such an approach is well stated by Mark Sagoff, 
who has repeatedly observed that there may be dramatic differences between the preferences 
people state as consumers with respect to such issues as wilderness preservation and those they 
articulate as citizens: members of a community with at least some shared interests.  For instance, 
people may have no interest in wilderness canoe tripping, regard theme parks as highly enjoyable, 
and nevertheless regard attempts to build a theme park in a wilderness area as thoroughly 
reprehensible.31  A similar dynamic might well emerge with respect to transportation planning: as 
consumers, Londoners might welcome the chance to shave a few minutes off their daily drives, but 
as citizens with a commitment to enhancing the quality of life in their community they might 
recognize and reject the negative environmental and social consequences of the road upgradings 
that would be necessary.  Such a process of deliberation was precluded by the consultants' 
approach, which perhaps unintentionally reflected the discourse of privatization that now 
permeates almost every aspect of Canadian political life by assuming that the role of transportation 
consumer is the only relevant one.   
                                                 
31.     Sagoff, "We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us, or, Conflict and Contradiction in 
Environmental Law," Environmental Law 12 (1982), pp. 283-315; Sagoff, "At the Shrine of Our 
Lady of Fatima, or, Why Political Questions Are Not All Economic," Arizona Law Review 23 
(1981), pp. 1283-1298.  This same point has been made more recently by Cass Sunstein in 
"Preferences and Politics," Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (no. 1, Winter 1991), pp. 14-19. 
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 Fourth, the technique used in the second stage of the consultants’ study to compare various 
roadway capacity improvement options contained its own built-in biases.   A scoring system was 
used to compare road projects on the basis of 21 criteria grouped under three headings: economic 
effects, effects on the social environment and effects on the natural environment.  These criteria 
are shown in Table 1.   For some criteria, quantitative responses could be provided; for instance, 
gasoline consumption associated with each project could be estimated in litres.  Others could only 
be dealt with in qualitative terms; for instance, impacts on wildlife, vegetation, wetlands and 
watercourses were stated only as low, medium or high.   The consultants then combined ratings 
of possible road projects on the 21 criteria into scores for each of the three broad categories; these 
were in turn combined to produce an overall rating.  Since the alternative of doing nothing to the 
existing road system was included as an option, and since rankings on each of the 21 criteria were 
published as part of the consultants' report, the technique provided some degree of transparency.  
However, the deck was stacked in favour of an auto-oriented transportation future in a number of 
ways, having to do largely with the way the criteria were combined into three sets for purposes of 
evaluation.  
 
 INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
     
 For instance, minimizing wildlife, vegetation, wetland and watercourse impacts is clearly 
an environmental objective.  It is less clear that minimizing auto emissions and energy 
consumption should be considered as such within the terms of the study, which presumed 
continued reliance on the automobile as a primary method of passenger transportation.  Once this 
presumption is made, then the option that minimizes congestion and delay and provides for 
relatively high and constant travel speeds emerges as the most environmentally sound one ... thus 
biasing even the study's findings on environmental impacts in favour of building more and faster 
 
 
13
roads.  It could just as well be argued that the environmentally sound option is the one that does 
not provide these, and thereby does not cast in concrete a longer-term reliance on the automobile.  
There may well be a trade-off between short term congestion impacts and longer-term 
sustainability, but the study’s approach does nothing to help us understand that tradeoff.  It also, 
of course, builds in a powerful and consistent bias against the option of not expanding the road 
system, an option whose impact on wildlife, vegetation, wetlands and watercourses is by definition 
minimal.  
 A similar bias was built into the consultants' treatment of the social environment.  Under 
the criterion of meeting future automobile travel demand, whose inclusion is in itself revealing, 
any option that would make peak-hour automobile travel less convenient was rated negatively.  
(The presumption of such "predict and provide" planning is that increased road capacity will 
necessarily reduce congestion and thereby save both time and fuel. However, a substantial body of 
evidence suggests that these effects are at least partially offset by additional traffic induced by the 
increased convenience and speed associated with the capacity improvement.32)  Selective 
attention to evidence is also found in the consultants' treatment of minimizing residential 
short-cutting by drivers, where any option that reduced peak-hour delays on arterial roads received 
high marks.  Once again, the presumption in favour of the car is evident; use of traffic-calming 
measures to achieve the same effect was dismissed with the claim that they "should not be 
expected to solve traffic problems which originate from outside the neighbourhood."33  Indeed, 
the authors of the report did not take the concept of traffic calming seriously except with reference 
to school zones, and appeared to regard as irrelevant a variety of European experiences with traffic 
                                                 
32.     CART, Traffic Calming, p. 11; Newman and Kenworthy, "Transport and urban form," pp. 
264-265; [U.K.] Standing Advisory Committee on Trunk Road Assessment, Trunk Roads and the 
Generation of Traffic (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, December 1994), chapters 4 and 
11. 
33.     IMC, Final Report, Part III, p. 3.7. 
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calming.  These two examples show that an underlying fixation on road-building was perhaps 
embedded even more strongly in the treatment of the social environment than in the treatment of 
the natural environment.  So, too, does the inclusion of good emergency vehicle access as a 
criterion under the social environment heading; this was assessed based simply on increased 
overall road travel speed, thus adding weight in the rankings to any measure that would contribute 
to that objective.34  
 Explicit adoption by municipal government of sustainability as a guiding principle might 
have generated quite a different methodological approach.  So, too, might even cursory attention 
to equity issues: in the London study, such issues were simply not considered, despite the 
substantial proportion of the population that is essentially immobilized by auto-centred 
transportation planning and the land use patterns it supports.  For households or individuals 
without access to a car, peak-hour auto travel times are likely to be of little interest or relevance, so 
the question then becomes one of whose travel costs are considered important.  The London study 
effectively treated such people as invisible: for planning purposes, they just didn't count.  For 
working class families who cannot afford to move out of existing neighbourhoods to glossy new 
suburbs, it is at least conceivable that the preservation of those neighbourhoods might be much 
more important than the opportunities supposedly associated with even quicker travel into and out 
of the downtown core. 
 In evaluating social impacts of road upgrading on existing communities, a high impact 
rating was assigned if increased traffic volumes would affect "stable," primarily residential areas; 
it was considered less important to minimize traffic impacts on areas whose "primarily residential 
character was in transition with relatively high tenant levels, existing redevelopments and 
intensive zoning potential."35  So tenants are not really residents, and stable communities can 
                                                 
34.     Ibid., Part II, p. 3.12. 
35.     Ibid., Part II, pp. 3.11-3.12. 
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consist only of homeowners.  These are just the most obvious examples of class bias in the TPR; 
they suffice to underscore the fact that the consequences of transportation planning are not 
distributionally neutral, and it is not a win-win exercise: there will be winners and losers, even 
before we consider such issues as sustainability and implications for future generations.   Like the 
consistent disregard of sustainability issues in the consultants' study, the disregard of such issues 
demands explicit defence.  
 A fifth and final curious dimension of the transportation plan involves its treatment of the 
relationship between city and suburbs.  As suburbanization proceeds apace and office and 
commercial activity increasingly relocate to malls and office parks at the edge of the existing urban 
area, London is starting to experience problems of downtown crime and residential and 
commercial abandonment usually associated with much larger centres.36  Potential conflicts 
between downtown revitalization and suburbanization were submerged in the choice of criteria for 
ranking capacity improvement options, whose ability to contribute to downtown redevelopment 
was assessed solely in terms of reduction in travel times to and from downtown.  However, an 
approach to redevelopment that emphasizes quick and easy commuting to and from suburban 
locations is at least as likely to result in the hollowing out characteristic of many U.S. cities after 
working hours.  As just one example, a recent review of redevelopment efforts in Boston's 
Roxbury district noted that: "The fear of crime is the greatest deterrent to shopping and 
reinvestment" and that: "Round-the-clock activity," which is a critical ingredient in crime 
prevention, "requires a strong residential base within the business district."37 
                                                 
36.     See e.g. Pat Currie, "Will downtown London ever get it together?" London Free Press 
Business Monday, April 17, 1995, pp. 8-9. 
37.     Jeff Minter, "Reinventing Roxbury's Dudley Square," Urban Land 54(1), January 1995, 
pp. 34-37.  For a comprehensive treatment of the connections among mixed use, crime prevention 
and sustainable urban form see Irvin Waller, "Safer Cities: A Prerequisite for Sustainable Urban 
Development," paper presented to OECD Dublin Seminar, "Partnerships for People in Cities," 
October 20-21, 1993.  
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 The proposed approach to transportation planning may not be consistent with creating and 
maintaining that residential base.  Indeed, the livability and safety associated with a largely 
traffic-free urban core would be key factors in making living there more attractive.  These are 
complex issues, and ones not easily resolved.  My point here is simply that understanding of the 
complexities of downtown revitalization is hindered, rather than helped by the simplistic approach 
taken to London's transportation planning.  Further, an approach to transportation planning 
explicitly organized around the concept of sustainability might assign special priority to support 
for downtown revitalization, because of the multiple social and environmental payoffs from 
increased densities and mixed uses, rather than treating it (as the study did) as just one economic 
criterion among five.  
 
Conclusion: Urban Ecology and Urban Political Economy 
 
The story so far suggests that planning as it is actually done at the municipal level has not been 
substantially affected by many years of governmental rhetoric about sustainability, and is even less 
concerned with issues of equity.  The situation in London at the moment is more complex and 
marginally more hopeful.  The TPR was accepted by London City Council in October 1994 but 
other aspects of the official plan development exercise continued, with more extensive public 
participation, under the rubric of "Vision '96".  In November, 1995, city planning department staff 
released for public comment a complete package of proposed amendments to the Official Plan.38  
 Perhaps because they were the result of a process that included numerous open public 
meetings, the proposed amendments are more progressive than the TPR.  There is an explicit 
commitment to environmental responsibility, not only in a "goal statement" but also in proposals 
                                                 
38.     Proposed Vision '96 Official Plan Amendment, first draft (London: City of London, 
November 1995).   
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to increase the number of designated Environmentally Significant Areas (ESAs), which "should be 
preserved in their natural state," from five to 20;39 predictably, both the number and the size of the 
proposed ESAs are now being challenged by some affected landowners.  The land use planning 
principle "that local actions can have consequences beyond our boundaries and for future 
generations" is given explicit recognition.40   In direct contrast to the assumptions underlying the 
TPR, the draft amendments specifically refer to "intensification of land use in existing urban areas 
involving infill, re-development and the conversion of existing buildings" as a means of meeting a 
substantial component of future housing demand,41 and recognize that "some relief from normal 
zoning standards" may be necessary for such projects.42   The draft amendments also include 
such long overdue measures as a variety of initiatives to facilitate transit use; improved conditions 
for bicyclists; and the development of a pedestrian path system.   
 Encouragingly, the draft amendments mandate Council to investigate and implement 
traffic calming methods "where necessary to increase pedestrian safety and improve the overall 
quality of the urban environment,"43 although they fail to specify what should count as a 
demonstration of necessity.  Perhaps most significantly, downtown revitalization is explicitly 
identified as a goal of the Official Plan, and the draft amendments include commitments to 
promoting residential development as well as to a "safe and attractive pedestrian environment".44  
This focus on residential development is important not only because of its relation to livability and 
crime prevention, but also because Newman and Kenworthy identify central city residential 
                                                 
39.     Ibid., s. 15.6.1. 
40.     Ibid., s. 2.3.1. 
41.     Ibid., s. 2.5.7. 
42.     Ibid., s. 3.2.3. 
43.     Ibid., s. 18.2.16. 
44.     Ibid., s. 2.12. 
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density as having a strong correlation with the amount of non-automotive travel.  Employment 
density, on the other hand, has no such relation with choice of travel modes.45  
 Were commitments like those just outlined to be respected in the actual case-by-case 
process of making planning decisions, an increasingly serious tension would emerge between 
those commitments and the priorities built into the TPR, which is incorporated into the proposed 
Official Plan by reference.46   The TPR’s priorities are both auto-oriented and centrifugal, 
organized around the assumption of a settlement pattern in which suburbanites drive to and from 
downtown for specific work and entertainment purposes and presupposing that the objective of 
planning should be to make that drive as quick and convenient as possible.  The question of 
whether achieving a livable, mixed-use downtown area is compatible with transportation planning 
organized around speeding up the process of getting to downtown, but also the process of leaving 
it remains unanswered.  It is also important to note that with the exception of a few laudable 
provisions dealing with making new developments more transit-friendly, the equity issues 
associated with organizing both transportation and land-use planning around automobile transport 
remain entirely unaddressed in the draft amendments.  Neither was the TPR's modest target for 
increased transit use raised, although London’s public transit authority has meanwhile been 
promoting a package of measures aimed at increasing ridership even over the short term.47   
 Unfortunately, the transportation plan's priorities correspond closely to the distribution of 
political advantage within the land use decision making process.  Auto-centred transportation 
strategies offer substantial benefits to relatively rich, well organized political clienteles, of which 
affluent commuters are only one among many.  Road-building projects create jobs that are 
directly attributable to government expenditure decisions, which is why they are so consistently 
                                                 
45.     Newman and Kenworthy, "Transport and urban form," pp. 262-263 
46.     Vision '96, s. 2.11.1.  
47.     Joe Ruscitti, "LTC proposals woo new riders," London Free Press, November 29, 1995, p. 
B1. 
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popular under the rubric of infrastructure.  They are also an essential part of a land use policy that 
fuels the profits of the so-called land development industry and its symbionts in construction; this 
dynamic probably drove the behind-the-scenes politics of annexation in London.   
 Conversely, the political resources of most of the major losers from such a set of 
transportation and land use priorities are limited.  The politically effective subset of the 
population normally encounters the negative consequences of roads only when they impinge 
directly on particular neighbourhoods or locally valued features of the natural environment, which 
may be why opposition to the transportation-related aspects of the official plan has been 
concentrated among suburbanites living in proximity to the proposed ring road corridor.48  A 
profile of the population that is at risk of being without access to a car for economic reasons, or of 
being worst hit by having to keep a car running on a low and uncertain income, probably 
corresponds very closely to the demographic profile of political marginalization in general.  
 Over the short term opposition to all but the most visibly destructive road projects, in 
London and elsewhere, is likely to remain largely localized, and therefore vulnerable to 
accusations of NIMBYism and tactics of divide and conquer; broader programmatic opposition 
will be difficult to mobilize.  Articulating a vision of more sustainable and equitable cities in ways 
that make a real difference to transportation priorities will depend on a clear and accessible vision 
of a city in which automobile-related land uses are far less important.  Newman and Kenworthy 
provide a starting point by acknowledging the central role played by transportation as a 
determinant of urban form.  As planning guidelines, they suggest restricting the road supply in a 
city to 2-3 km per capita; restricting the availability of central city parking, while providing good 
public transit access "and a series of central city policies ... that allows a central city to compete 
strongly with suburban centres where easy parking is available"; accepting average urban travel 
                                                 
48.     Chip Martin, "Ring road plan riles residents of areas designated for route," London Free 
Press, January 11, 1996, p. B1. 
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speeds of 30 km/h as adequate; providing a rapid transit option that is substantially faster than 
average traffic speed; and extensive use of traffic calming to increase the attractiveness of walking 
and bicycling to work (and by extension of living closer to work).49  As the land use component of 
"reurbanization," which is clearly a long range process, they suggest gradually increasing 
residential and employment densities, most particularly in the central city, by restricting 
development at the fringes and concentrating on redevelopment.50 
 As we have seen, the transportation planners' assertion that Londoners would reject such a 
future is precarious, since this is not the kind of question they were asked.  Even if they had been, 
however, statistics without context would probably have been less persuasive than concrete 
images of all kinds of neighbourhoods in a higher density, more livable city where less use is made 
of automobiles.  Because few Canadians have direct experience of life in such a city, considerable 
imagination will be required to apply the techniques and real-world examples cited by Peter 
Calthorpe in The Next American Metropolis51 to the situation of cities like London in a way that 
makes an urban future consisting of something other than more of the same seem feasible as well 
as attractive.  
 Beyond imagination, coalitions will have to be forged as broadly as possible.  This point is 
particularly important given the changing political climate in Ontario.  The new Conservative 
government was elected in June, 1995 on the basis of a direct appeal to the resentments of the rich.  
Its "Common Sense" platform combined aggressive cuts in social spending with proposed tax cuts 
most of whose benefits would accrue to the most affluent Ontarians.  Those resentments seemed 
to follow clearer than usual geographical divisions, at least in the Toronto area.  The 
Conservatives were electorally weak in all but the most affluent areas of Metropolitan Toronto, but 
                                                 
49.     Newman and Kenworthy, "Transport and urban form," pp. 265-266. 
50.     Ibid., pp. 267-268.   
51.     Calthorpe, The Next American Metropolis. 
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extremely strong in the fast-growing suburbs and edge cities outside Metro's boundaries in what 
has become known as the Greater Toronto Area or GTA.  According to some observers, the 
Conservatives' planned cutbacks in transfer payments to municipalities promise to be especially 
devastating to Metro Toronto.52  Along with the new government's announced intention to relax 
existing land use controls on low-density development, the cutbacks will lead municipalities 
throughout the province into an increasingly desperate competition for development as they try to 
expand their tax bases.  Whether this strategy in fact generates net increases in revenue is 
debatable; recent evidence from case studies in the London region strongly suggests that it does 
not.53  
 These developments suggest the potential emergence in Ontario of urban conflict 
organized U.S.-style, with downtowns and the city governments that have to service them pitted 
against suburbs and exurbs.  In the near future the latter will usually win, on transportation issues 
as on much else, even though city governments may genuinely be trying to promote downtown 
revitalization with the limited range of policy instruments at their disposal.54  Over the longer 
term there is at least some hope for change.  Environmental awareness appears to be growing 
even among people who would not consider themselves environmentalists, although they often 
lack forums in which to discuss and evaluate transportation issues as citizens rather than just as 
transportation consumers.  Perhaps a more important trend is that as a result of stagnating 
incomes, high levels of unemployment and corporate re-engineering in both public and private 
sectors, a growing proportion of the working-age population will never be substantially better off 
                                                 
52.     John Barber, "How a city becomes nasty and brutal," The Globe and Mail, November 9, 
1995, p. A12. 
53.     Gabriel Dekel, "The Fiscal Impact of Development: A Regional Perspective in Canada," 
Land Use Policy 11 (1994), pp. 128-141. 
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than we are today.  With that realization comes an entirely accurate perception of enhanced 
economic vulnerability.   
 When it becomes clear that moving to newly created suburbs and exurbs to escape the city 
and the declining quality of life it offers is an unaffordable dream, the balance of electoral power 
may slowly shift in favour of preserving existing neighbourhoods and of settlement patterns that 
avoid the financially draining need to buy the second car, or even the first.  The Canadian 
Automobile Association recently estimated the annual cost of owning a typical new economy car 
at C$ 7,700, assuming that it is kept for four years.55   Buyers of used cars no doubt save on 
depreciation, but repair and maintenance costs will at least partly offset that saving.  For 
households paying for their transportation expenses with before-tax dollars, the economic payoff 
from doing without at least one car is far higher than any wage or salary gains that can reasonably 
be anticipated.   Thus there exists at least the theoretical prospect of building broad coalitions 
around the image of a city that is more densely populated, but also more environmentally 
responsible, more affordable and vastly more livable for its residents.  
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  Table I: 
 Goals and Objectives, Identification and Evaluation 
 of London, Ontario Roadway System Capacity Alternatives 
 
GOAL OBJECTIVES 
Economic environment: to 
achieve continued and sustainable 
economic development in the 
community 
1.To minimize total travel costs (equated here with 
number of vehicle hours of travel) 
2.   To minimize construction costs  
3.   To support designated growth area development 
demand (measured by with the number of peak 
hour trips accommodated) 
4.   To support continued downtown growth and     
development (measured by change in travel time 
from downtown) 
5.   To minimize property acquisition costs 
Social and cultural environment: 
to protect and enhance 
neighbourhoods and communities 
6.   To meet future auto travel demand 
7.   To provide a travel mode choice selection 
8.   To provide a safe transportation system (with    
safety defined only in terms of traffic accidents) 
9.   To minimize residential short-cutting impacts 
10.  To minimize proximity impacts 
11.  To minimize displacement of land use 
12.  To minimize residential noise impacts 
13.  To minimize transportation improvement visual 
impacts 
14.  To minimize community fragmentation 
15.  To provide good emergency vehicle access 
Natural environment: 
to protect and enhance the natural 
environment 
16.  To minimize wildlife impacts 
17.  To minimize vegetation impacts 
18.  To minimize wetland impacts 
19.  To minimize watercourse impacts 
20.  To minimize auto emission levels 
21.  To minimize energy consumption 
 
Source: IMC Consulting Group, London Transportation Plan Review: Final Report (March 1994), 
3.5-3.17. 
 
